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Children as Witnesses: A Symposium on Child Competence
and the Accused's Right to Confront Child Witnesses
AViVA A.

ORENSTEIN*

The rules of evidence provide a mechanism for sorting through the mass of
information that could be presented at trial, winnowing irrelevancies, and excising
potentially distracting or unfairly prejudicial material. They also reflect basic tenets
about how the finder of fact determines truth. For instance, the rules shield the jury
from, or at least alert it to, some potentially unreliable sources. Most importantly for
the purposes of this symposium, the evidence rules reflect and perpetuate deeply-held
notions of who is sufficiently trustworthy to serve as a witness. The rules control who
may testify, what the witnesses may say, and what sorts of questions may be asked of
the witnesses on cross-examination.
Although problems concerning witnesses are always interesting and importantraising issues of competence, hearsay, impeachment, and expertise-such issues
become even more difficult in criminal cases, where we must incorporate the accused's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. As applied to children, with their stilldeveloping cognitive abilities, immaturity, susceptibility to influence, and need for
protection, such questions about witnesses are particularly acute.
Traditionally, the prospect of children as witnesses has presented thorny questions
of competence. When are children able to testify? At what age do we trust that they are
telling the truth, that they possess the cognitive skills to perceive such truth and the
verbal skills to transmit their knowledge? Does it matter if the child understands the
solemnity of the oath? At what age can a child witness be meaningfully crossexamined?
Concerns that arise with adult witnesses are heightened with children. To a certain
extent, everyone is suggestible and susceptible of bias. With children, whose practical
knowledge of the world is incomplete and who are especially dependent on others
emotionally and physically, the potential for undue influence and bias increases.
Relatedly, outright intimidation, another potential problem for adult witnesses,
demands a more complicated and sensitive inquiry when child witnesses are involved.
The nature of children's cognitive abilities and practical experiences raises further
questions in connection with the Supreme Court's recent reinterpretation of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause. Crawford v. Washington' held that if a statement
used at trial is testimonial, the declarant/witness must be made available for crossexamination. In defining the pivotal term "testimonial," the Court emphasized the
intentions of the declarant/witness and whether the speaker could reasonably expect the
statement he was making to be used in a future legal proceeding against the person
implicated. In the case of children, who are unfamiliar with the legal system, and hence
may not realize the potential or even obvious uses of their statements at future trials,
such a focus on the expectations of the declarant/witness is problematic.
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Finally, because of their immaturity and vulnerability, children may deserve special
protection. If testifying would be traumatic, should the child be deemed unavailable?
Are there any accommodations that can be made to the physical or psychological
environment of the courtroom to help the child witness feel more comfortable without
compromising the rights of the accused?
The scholars in this symposium address these questions from different angles,
bringing to bear history, psychology, and a careful analysis of the recent Supreme
Court cases on confrontation. They address five important themes: (1) the special
status and rights of children as witnesses; (2) ways in which the special case of child
witnesses illuminates contradictions, ambiguities, unresolved questions, and the
unfortunate tendency towards all-or-nothing thinking in recent Supreme Court Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence; (3) practical suggestions for balancing the interests of child
witnesses and the rights of the accused in criminal cases; (4) an inquiry into the fate of
pre-Crawfordcases, most importantly Maryland v. Craig;2 and (5) a critique of the
uses and abuses of historical research by the Supreme Court in its attempt to address
issues of confrontation.
Professors David Tanenhaus and William Bush provide a fascinating and vital
historical overview of children on the witness stand. Their brief essay, Toward a
History of Children as Witnesses, presents an invaluable summary of attitudes toward
children in general, and child witnesses in particular. Their overview aptly argues for
recognizing nuance and multiple threads, rather than searching for one fixed and
certain historical truth about child witnesses. Placing the issue of children in a larger
historical and philosophical context, their essay also debunks false assumptions about
the nature of children's rights and conceptions of childhood as linear or progressing to
more responsibility, freedom, and autonomy.
Tanenhaus and Bush note the differences between the approaches to history taken
by lawyers-particularly those currently serving on the United States Supreme Courtand historians, and warn against attempts at oversimplification of what is necessarily a
nuanced and sometimes contradictory record. As historians, they express skepticism
about the accuracy, utility, and wisdom of the Court's resolution of contemporary
constitutional questions through historical analysis. Uncovering courts' actual practices
concerning child testimony requires the historian's skill of understanding the motives
and approaches of the primary-source authors. For instance, Sir Matthew Hale's
writings in the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries about limiting child
witnesses may have been prompted by his desire to reform the law rather than to report
accurately the status quo. Tanenhaus and Bush demonstrate how social, cultural, and
philosophical notions of childhood affect the actual functions of trials. They
persuasively argue that scholars, for the periods they cover, must focus on case
histories and transcripts-not just on treatise writers' summaries of cases-to
understand the true nature of testimony. For instance, during the period they dub
"sheltered childhood," case studies indicate that, often, the decisive factor in how the
court treated a child witness depended on whether the child behaved in conformity with
social expectations.
Focusing on a specific period in English history, Professor Thomas Lyon and
Raymond Lamagna analyze in detail the historical record of the hearsay use of child
witness statements in rape cases heard in the Old Bailey from 1684 to 1789. Their

2. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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purpose is to illuminate and provide context for The King v. Brasier,3 a case cited by
Davis v. Washington,4 a confrontation case decided a year after Crawford.Daviscited
Brasieras historical support for the proposition that a hearsay declarant's statements
made after the emergency has passed are inadmissible. The Supreme Court used
Brasierto shore up the distinction between nontestimonial requests for help that need
not be subject to cross-examination, and post-incident testimonial statements that
trigger the right of confrontation.
If indeed the Supreme Court believes that the eighteenth-century English practice is
vital to understanding the intentions of the Framers, then at the very least, it is essential
that those English cases are correctly characterized. The confusion and contradiction
Lyon and Lamagna document in the Old Bailey case histories from the Brasierera are
at odds with the historical certitude claimed by the Supreme Court in support of its
testimonial approach. Lyon and Lamagna's inquiry into the case histories debunks the
notion that children's hearsay was routinely excluded either before or after Brasier.In
many cases, children's hearsay statements were admitted even though they could not
testify. Such hearsay may not have been sufficient to convict for the capital crime of
rape, but it often led to a conviction for sexual assault. Hence, children's hearsay was
afforded less weight, but was often received, particularly when it was the best a party
could offer.
Rather than vindicating the Supreme Court's tidy world of categorical constitutional
rules, the history of these child rape cases evinces a practical approach to admitting the
evidence. The willingness to be flexible in order to achieve the fairest result explains
why, despite the categorical rule that children under nine could not be sworn, an
individualized inquiry into the capacity of a child to take an oath, advocated by Sir
Matthew Hale, was adopted by some courts. Lyon and Lamagna make a compelling
case that the Old Bailey cases demonstrated a best-evidence-available approach,
reflecting the seriousness of the crime, the paucity of other evidence, and the
pragmatism of the courts.
As do Tanenhaus and Bush, Professor Robert Mosteller questions the Supreme
Court's use of history. Like Lyon and Lamagna, Mosteller provides a close analysis of
Brasier, revealing the Court's ahistorical approach. In a startling piece of forensic
scholarship, Mosteller demonstrates how the Court used a version of the Brasiercase
not available to the Framers in arguing the Framers' original intent.
Mosteller meticulously examines the new Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses and uses the example of child testimony to
challenge the development of that doctrine. He demonstrates how looking at the
problems posed by child witnesses illuminates the Court's new confrontation doctrine.
In quoting the prophetic phrase, "a little child shall lead them," Mosteller aptly
encapsulates the way that tough questions about child witnesses reveal deep--and as
yet unresolved-problems with the Court's new approach to Sixth Amendment
confrontation.
Mosteller begins with the important observation that Crawfordand Davis, though
certainly revolutionary in approach, have actually answered only very narrow
questions. Crawfordpurposely did not define the term testimonial, and after Crawford,
we know for sure only that certain formal statements (such as affidavits and prior

3. (1779) 1 Leach 199, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B.).
4. 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006).
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testimony) and statements made by an adult to a police officer at a police station are
testimonial. From Davis, decided the following year, we learn that statements made to
police officers in a domestic-violence case after the emergency has subsided are
testimonial, but statements made during a 911 call for help and at the scene while an
emergency still existed are nontestimonial.
Mosteller makes significant contributions to the discussion on confrontation, using
the case of children to deconstruct the Supreme Court's emphasis on intent and on the
formality of the proceedings. First, he presents a review and careful taxonomy of the
various types of confrontation cases that have arisen in the lower courts concerning
children, and explains the various trends in whether to characterize children's out-ofcourt statements as testimonial. Mosteller does an able job of demonstrating where
consensus has developed. For instance, almost all children's statements to police will
be deemed testimonial, regardless of the child's subjective understanding of the
possible future uses of his statement. Mosteller also identifies the most difficult of the
child confrontation cases as those that present dual roles for out-of-court questioners.
Questioning by police to prepare for trial is clearly testimonial, while questioning by a
doctor to address pain is clearly not. Often, however, especially with children, the
purposes will be mixed. While trying to help a child medically or psychologically, the
questioner also may attempt to collect evidence for use at trial.
Second, Mosteller critiques the Supreme Court's approach, noting its seemingly
shifting definition of what is testimonial, particularly regarding the question of whose
perspective matters, that of the declarant/witness or the person hearing/soliciting the
child's statement. He points out that a Confrontation Clause analysis that focused
exclusively on the intention of the child speaker would almost always find that the
child had no intention to give testimony; this, in turn, would routinely admit such
statements as nontestimonial, a dubious result, and one which the lower courts have not
reached.
Finally, Mosteller brings together two different strands of Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence that are rarely considered in tandem: (1) the question of what statements
are testimonial and hence subject to the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses,
and (2) the manner in which confrontation take place. Under Maryland v. Craig, the
Court allowed certain compromises in terms of the face-to-face nature of the
confrontation where a child might be traumatized by having to face the accused.
Mosteller laments the tendency of some prosecutors to exempt the child from the
process and to have the child declared unable to testify. While recognizing the
difficulties to the child and the prosecution, he eloquently makes the case that every
effort should be made to encourage testimony and cross-examination and that the law
should not create incentives to declare children unavailable.
The symposium benefited tremendously from the astute commentaries of Professors
Tom Lininger and Myrna Raeder. In Kids Say the DarndestThings: The Prosecutorial
Use of Hearsay Statements by Children, Lininger distills and addresses three vital
issues: (1) how courts can define whether statements by children are testimonial, (2)
what accommodations could make the experience of being a child witness less
traumatic, and (3) how forfeiture should be defined in the context of children.
Lininger addresses many of the same concerns as Mosteller, but takes a slightly
more prosecution-friendly approach. Lininger concurs with Mosteller, observing that a
declarant-centered approach that merely focuses on what the child believes will lead to
too little confrontation. Instead, he recommends a hybrid approach whereby "a child
declarant's statement would be testimonial ifthe child could foresee later prosecutorial
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use, or if the government elicited the statement (or contrived a third-party interview
that elicited the statement) for forensic purposes. 5
In considering potential accommodations for child witnesses, Lininger, like
Mosteller, advocates for the continued viability of the Supreme Court doctrine in
Maryland v. Craig, which permitted a child witness to testify via closed-circuit
television where evidence of potential trauma existed. Lininger acknowledges that
Justice Scalia, author of the new Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and dissenter in
Craigis wildly hostile to the Court's balancing approach and to any special deals for
child witnesses. Nevertheless, Lininger believes that the closed-circuit-television
method of cross-examination is still a viable option post-Crawford.He also advocates
other creative approaches to making the courtroom more comfortable for child
witnesses, including use of support personnel for the child, greater judicial supervision
of the questions on cross-examination, and the substitution of pretrial crossexamination for cross-examination at trial.
Finally, Lininger tries to steer a middle road on the issue of forfeiture. He rejects the
argument that all domestic violence cases present forfeiture arguments, and instead
argues for a more expansive notion of forfeiture than Mosteller advocates. Lininger
observes that "[b]y making the victim indispensable, the new confrontation
jurisprudence has made the victim a more attractive target for coercion by the
defendant." 6 He proposes a test whereby forfeiture extends beyond obvious witness
tampering to include wrongful conduct by the accused that "foreseeably and
proximately causes the absence" of the child witness. This standard would include the
incapacitation of the witness even when the primary purpose was not to silence the
witness.
In her piece entitled Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a "Testimonial"
World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, Raeder
summarizes the challenges creates by child witnesses and critiques the historical
approach, noting that "[i]t should come as no surprise that eighteenth-century values
would silence the voices of children in the twenty-first-century courtroom.",7 She
argues that the Supreme Court's rigid and categorical testimonial approach hampers
both the accused (who seemingly has no remaining constitutional challenge for
nontestimonial statements) and the prosecution (which is sometimes unable to produce
a child witness and must therefore forfeit use of a child's testimonial statement).
Although clearly not enamored with the Court's testimonial approach, Raeder
acknowledges that it is here to stay, and focuses, as do Mosteller and Lininger, on the
practical implications of the new testimonial regime. In struggling with the difficult
question of when children's statements are testimonial, Raederjoins the other scholars
in this symposium in rejecting the facile and accused-unfriendly notion that all child
hearsay is constitutionally admissible because children do not understand the trial
process sufficiently to be capable of making testimonial statements.
Raeder also argues for the continued vitality of Maryland v. Craig, despite its
conflict in tone and constitutional theory with the Court's jurisprudence in Crawford.

5. Tom Lininger, Kids Say the Darnedest Things: The ProsecutorialUse of Hearsay

Statements by Children, 82 IND. L.J. 999, 1002 (2007).
6. Id.at 1006.
7. Myma S. Raeder, Comments on ChildAbuse Litigation in a "Testimonial" World: The
Intersectionof Competency, Hearsay,and Confrontation,82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1009 (2007).
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She notes that, with the new approach to confrontation, more children will have to
testify and courts will have to find ways of making that happen. To that end, Raeder
recommends judicial education, the presence of victim advocates, and active judicial
monitoring to avoid harassment of child witnesses. She notes that the doctrine of
forfeiture, which would eliminate the accused's ability to question the child at all,
presents a much less desirable alternative to Craig'sbalancing approach. She agrees
with Mosteller and Lyon that there is tremendous benefit in having the child testify,
even sans oath and even under slightly altered conditions. Testimony via the
protections offered by Craig is always preferable to simply admitting the child's
hearsay in the child's absence without an opportunity for questioning of any sort.
On the issue of forfeiture, Raeder observes that the current jurisprudence leaves the
system with bad choices on either extreme. If forfeiture is interpreted too broadly, and
child hearsay is routinely admitted, the constitutional rights of the accused fly out the
window. Conversely, too narrow a definition of forfeiture means that when a child
witness has been intimidated or otherwise prevented from testifying, the accused will
benefit from that misconduct by entirely excluding the unavailable child's statements.
Raeder ponders how future cases will define meaningful confrontation of children,
given children's tendency to freeze on the witness stand, forget prior incidents or
statements, or become too emotional to testify. Raeder8joins Mosteller in calling for
accommodation of these "less-than-perfect witnesses."
As to the testimonial character of mixed-use statements-those used for law
enforcement as well as therapy or medical care-Raeder agrees with Mosteller's
analysis of the developing case law, and she concludes that "Crawford appears to
doom the use of multidisciplinary teams in child abuse as a way of introducing
statements of children who do not testify." She also finds it anomalous, if not
disingenuous, that courts, in assessing the testimonial value of a statement in a sexual
abuse case to a doctor or teacher, do not take into account the mandatory reporting
requirements of those professionals. Raeder argues that an identification of a child
abuse perpetrator in a medical setting should be deemed testimonial because it is a
child safety issue "inextricably intertwined with a law-enforcement purpose."9 She
notes, however, that courts have continued to treat statements to private individuals as
nontestimonial, so that many hearsay statements will still be admitted under the
Crawfordstandard.
Each of the pieces in the symposium makes a significant contribution to the
scholarship surrounding children as witnesses and sheds light on the new Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence. In addition to offering historical insights and practical
suggestions, this body of work challenges the overarching assumptions of the Supreme
Court's new approach to confrontation. As some of our authors demonstrate, from the
time of the Old Bailey, courts exhibited flexibility and practical wisdom in their use of
children's statements. Live sworn testimony, subject to cross-examination, has always
been considered best. However, there is good evidence that, historically, courts were
willing to admit second best evidence-unsworn testimony, or even garden-variety
hearsay. Furthermore, given the complexity of the historical record and the differences
in perspective and context between the eighteenth-century and today, it is not at all

8. Id. at 1022; accord Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and
Exceptions to Confrontation: "A Little Child Shall Lead Them," 82 IND. L.J. 917 (2007).
9. Raeder, supra note 7, at 1025.
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obvious why the approaches of the Old Bailey cases should govern our modem law of
confrontation.
Happily, the scholars in the symposium offer more than just criticism; while
working within the confines of Crawfordand Davis, they suggest creative solutions to
the very difficult questions posed by child witnesses. In doing so, they wrestle with the
delicate balance between child safety and the rights of the accused, propose effective
compromises concerning the methods of cross-examination, and offer thoughtful
suggestions for the development of the forfeiture doctrine. The authors' practical tone,
their acknowledgment that children pose special challenges, and their willingness to
consider context-based, nuanced solutions contrast favorably with the Court's rigid,
categorical, and (supposedly) historical approach to the Sixth Amendment.

